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How to Tame The New Wild-Wild West: Potential Lassos for Virtual Crime 
Introduction 
Online virtual worlds have become, without equivocation, as advanced, complex, 
and dynamic as the “real world” we grew up in. The advancements in these communities 
has been rapid by and standards leaving a somewhat unusual situation in their wake. As 
these communities continue to evolve they have, to varying degrees, come to replicate 
certain parts of the real world, in particular, capitalist economies. The intricacies of 
operating such a marketplace aside, their development has for some, served to provide a 
striking example of the once theoretical, and presently realized, threat due to lack of 
regulation.  
As quick as these worlds have come into existence one might logically assume 
that just as they replicate the real worlds economies so too would they with at least 
baseline regulations however, that is not the case. Little if any efforts have been made to 
regulate these booming economies as consequently, the illegal activities that are actively 
policed in the modern day real world economy, have sprung up unchecked and to some 
extent unhindered in the virtual setting. In particular, virtual worlds present a ripe 
opportunity for money launderers and individuals or groups that seek to commit fraud – 
most often the type of which would be dealt with by securities regulations. 
 This paper seeks to examine the money laundering schemes and securities 
violations that have been, and if no changes are make, are likely to continue within 
virtual communities. The first part of the paper provides an introduction into virtual 
worlds, their economies, and isolated examples of the fraudulent activity already taking 
place in virtual worlds. Part two provides baseline information into the practice of money 
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laundering and then advances that understanding to explore how such activity can be 
executed in the virtual setting. The third part of the paper will examine how existing 
governmental bodies, branches, and legislation might serve to prevent and secure online 
communities from these types of harmful illegal activity. The fourth and final section 
provides some brief insight, and words of caution, for those charged with regulating 
virtual worlds.  
  
Part I: Welcome to the Virtual World 
 
Virtual worlds began to take their most rudimentary form as early as the 1970s.
1
 
The earliest virtual worlds were text-based, and allowed users to communicate, chat, and 
interact with one another by typing set commands.
2
 As one might imagine the text based 
worlds soon gave way to graphics based worlds which serve as the foundation of modern 
virtual worlds.
3
 
 Eager to capitalize on the potential profit in this newly emerging market, the 
video game industry soon began relying upon the multiplayer virtual world format.
4
 Until 
the 1990s however, the video games developed were unlike the early text based worlds in 
that they were not persistent. This is to say that once the game ended and the player 
logged, off all trace of that player disappeared and the game reverted back to its initial 
stage.
5
 Starting towards the tail end of the 90s, and in particular with the introduction of 
                                                 
1
 Beth Simone Noveck, The State of Play, 49 N.Y.L. Sch. L.Rev. 1, 6 (2004) (nothing that early virtual 
worlds evolved out of the text-based social environments of multi-user  dungeons (also known as multi-
user domains or dimensions) such as MUD1(1979) or LamdaMOO(1990)). 
2
 Id. (the text commands would allow a user to communicate actions to other users and thereby to act out 
scenes and scenarios across a distance like an online Dungeons and Dragons). 
3
 Id. (“In a MUD, the fantasy is described exclusively through words, Subsequently, other designers, such 
as Randall Farmer and Chip Morningstar, created graphical role-playing worlds like Habitat, the first multi-
user domain with a graphical interface.”). 
4
 Id., at 7.  
5
 Id. 
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Ultima Online, the persistent and social aspects of early text based worlds were unified 
with the gaming elements of the industries, later in time, developed worlds.
6
 Upon its 
introduction in 1998 Ultima
7
 received nearly a quarter million subscriptions and its 
progeny, Lineage, came to attract more than 4 million; unquestionably then at this point 
the MMORPG (Massively Multiplayer Online Role Playing Game) boom had begun.
8
 
 Most recently there has been in influx of non-game play associated worlds such as 
Second Life, the Sims, City of Heroes, and Eve Online. These reality based games do not 
provide storyline or goals for their participants and instead merely serve as stage setters 
for participants to engage in any activity they see fit. Most often these worlds provide 
their users the ability to create and design a great deal of the content within the world; 
this would certainly include clothing, possessions, and structures.
9
 In so doing, virtual 
world administrators ensured not only exclusivity, but also independence from game 
based worlds.
10
 Critically though, this means that so long as bandwidth is continually 
provided these worlds will continue to exist, to expand, and to evolve.
11
 (emphasis added) 
 
 
                                                 
6
 See generally, Viktor Mayer-Schonberger, Napster’s Second Life?: The Regulatory Challenges of Virtual 
Worlds, 100 Nw. U. L. Rev. 1775, 1782-88 (2006). 
7
 See Noveck, supra note 1, at 7 (“Ultima Online linked the graphics or video games to the social and role 
playing culture of MUDs to the internet in what is considered to be the first persistent, massively-
multiplayer commercial success.”). 
8
 See MMOGchar.com, An Analysis of MMOG Subscriptions Growth Version 23.0, available at 
http://www.mmogchart.com/charts/ (the charts are most helpful in that they demonstrate clearly not only 
the meteoric rise in popularity of MMORPGs but also, and more critical to the point at hand, that it was 
indeed at the 1998 time period that began the MMORPG boom). 
9
 See Noveck, supra note 1, at 9 (noting the dual purpose of allowing users the ability to create their own 
content as it fosters in world creativity and productivity while simultaneously cutting down of development 
costs associate with building content). 
10
 Id., at 9-10. 
11
 It should be noted that the reality based worlds ability to continuously evolve provides the ability for true 
growth and development however, it brings along with it an opportunity ripe for exploitation by means of 
illegal activity. 
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A Real Economy in a Virtual World 
The developers and administrators have/had as their goal for these games, often 
by way of significant contributions from its users, to create and establish a very realistic 
world. Unsurprisingly then, as these reality based worlds come to mimic and adapt real 
world customs and institutions, large and productive economies have sprung up. 
Moreover, and undoubtedly more important to the issues to be examined in this paper, 
many of the virtual economies have currency which has real world monetary value. 
While this issue will be fleshed out later in the paper, for now Second Life can provide an 
illustrative example. 
Second Life, relative to the other reality based games, has a robust and diverse 
economy all its own.
12
 Second life has its own currency called the Linden Dollar (“LD”) 
which users rely upon to purchase virtual land, and pay for goods and services. The LD is 
readily exchangeable for U.S. dollars at a rate that fluctuates with demand and can be 
monitored on the Linden website.
13
 The exchangeability of LD into the U.S. dollars and 
back again has been one of the most important aspects to the development of private 
                                                 
12
 It should be noted that many commentators attriute the growth and popularity of Second Life and its 
economy to the rather unique stance Linden Labs takes of intellectual property. Specifically, Second Life 
allows its users to retain the intellectual property rights to any content which the user creates. As explained 
by Linden labs: 
 
Under Linden Lab’s Terms of Service, residents retain intellectual property rights in the 
original content they create in the Second Life world, including avatar characters, 
clothing, scripts, textures, objects and designs. The result is a vibrant marketplace of 
Second Life content. If you create it, you can sell it, trade it, and even give it away for 
free, subject of course to our Terms of Service. 
 
See, Second Life, IP Rights, http://secondlife.com/whatis/iprights.php  
13
 See, LindeX Market Data, available at, http://secondlife.com/statistics/economy-market.php (as of March 
2010 the exchange rate operated between 260-269 Linden Dollars to the U.S. Dollar); see also, 
UsableMarkets, Linden Dollars vs. Other Currencies, Mar. 16, 2008, available at, 
http://www.usablemarkets.com/2008/03/16/linden-dollars-vs-other-currencies/ (demonstrating that the 
Linden Dollar along with the Yen, Euro, and Pound appreciated in value relative to the U.S. Dollar over a 
period approaching four years). 
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enterprise in Second Life.
14
 Paradoxically, the ready exchange of LD to other real world 
currency also provides for a ripe opportunity for wrongdoers.  
The economies of Second Life and its reality based virtual world counterparts 
now represent a markets of significant size, and most likely power to boot.
15
 More 
importantly, these economies are expected to grow further as more participants, hailing 
from the world over seek to capitalize on the fertile ground of virtual commerce.
16
 
A Threat Realized: Virtual Banks and Fraudulent Investment Schemes 
Virtual economies represent sizeable financial opportunity and as such have attracted 
quite a bit of interest and activity from both the legitimate as well as the less savory 
online user. It really ought be of not great surprise that the virtual worlds that strive to 
offer its users a realistic alternative to the real world see the rise, in some respects, in 
illegal activity. While the threat of criminal activity remained largely theoretical in 
MMORPGs developmental and initial stages, the communities in present day are 
sophisticated and substantial
17
 enough to facilitate, if not permit, a worrying amount of 
                                                 
14
 See, Chris Gourlay & Abul Taher, Virtual Jihad Hits Second Life Website, Sunday Times (U.K.), Aug. 
5, 2007, at 4 (while the subject of the article is tangential to the point being made the authors noted that 
according to Linden Labs several hundred thousand pounds a day were exchanged in Second Life). 
15
 Albert C. Lin, Virtual Consumption: Second Life for Earth?, 2008 BYU L. Rev. 47, 84-85 (2008); see 
also, Schonberger, supra note 6, at 1788 (citing a 2001 estimate of Everquest economy as having an GNP 
of $135 million which at the time was equal to that of Russia); see also, Bobby Glushko, Tales of the 
(Virtual) City: Governing Property Disputes in Virtual Worlds, 22 Berkley Tech L.J. 507, 524 (2007) 
(noting that economists have estimated that the total gross domestic product of the virtual worlds exceeded 
seven billion dollars in the year 2008 which is comparable to the gross domestic product of Estonia or the 
Ivory Coast). 
16
 See,  Ben Quarmby, Pirates Among the Second Life Islands – Why you Should Monitor the Misuse of 
Your Intellectual Property in Online Virtual Worlds, 26 Cardozo Arts & Ent LJ 667, note 30 (2009) (the 
author notes that while Second Life is an interesting example it is by no means the most popular or heavily 
frequented virtual world on the market); see also, David Lazarus, Real Fear in Virtual Worlds, S.F. Chron., 
Sept. 15, 2006, available at http://articles.sfgate.com/2006-09-15/business/17310324_1_san-francisco-s-
linden-lab-second-life-linden-dollars (noting that half of all Second Life users live outside the United 
States). 
17
 See, Daniela Rosette, The Application of Real World Rules to Banks in Online Games and Virtual 
Worlds, 16 U. Miami Bus L. Rev. 279, at 285 (2008) (Referring to Professor Edward Castronova of 
California State University, Fullerton, who conducted an economic study in 2002 in which he estimated the 
average hourly wage for Norrath (the fantasy world of Sony’s Online 430,000 player game, Everquest) to 
Ian M.B. Leyden 
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illegal activity. The following examples illustrate this very point, and while they do no 
involved money laundering it should not require the leaping of any major intellectual 
hurdles to see how they could have. 
 In the online MMORPG EVE Online
18
 a user recently set up an in-world bank. 
The EVE Intergalactic Bank (“EIB”) as it was known, allowed players/users to deposit 
in-game currency and in return receive a few percentage points of interest over a given 
period of time.
19
 The bank operated for several months during which hundreds of players 
deposited their money.
20
 Although its unlikely to have actually occurred, the bank at least 
advertised loan and insurance products in addition to interest earning deposits
21
 and for 
all intents and purposes EIB seemed every bit as real and legitimate a bank as those we 
walk into every week.
22
 The EIB seemed a sound, natural progression in the thriving 
capitalist economy EVE Online fostered as it played a key role in the facilitation of 
entrepreneurial opportunity in the community.
23
 
                                                                                                                                                 
be about $3.42 and its Gross Domestic Product to be about $135 million. Moreover, if one assume the same 
rates for other online games, such as Ultima Online, Dark Age of Comelot, Asheron’s Call, and Anarchy 
Online, the workforce operating in these virtual worlds would generate more than $300 million in real 
wealth every year). 
18
 Eve Online, Frequently Asked Questions: Eve Basics, available at 
http://www.eveonline.com/faq/faq_01.asp (EVE Online is a popular science fiction based, persistent world 
where players take the role of spaceship pilots seeking fame, fortune, and adventure in a massive “galaxy.” 
The game enable participants to partake in player to player conflicts where the winner cans accumulate 
substantial monetary rewards. The game also operates much like a system of real world corporations by 
enabling participants to establish commercial and capitalist ventures where they can trade virtual items for 
real currency.). 
19
 James Grimmelman, When Virtual Banks Fail, The Laboratorium, Aug. 2006, available at 
http://laboratorium.net/archive/2006/08/26/when_virtual_banks_fail (noting that the interest rates “may be 
high by offline standards, but it’s low for in-world ventures, abductively suggesting low risk. Indeed, the 
falling value of the ISK versus the dollar (50% or more a year) made the EIB the practical equivalent of 
treading water. It just beat holding useless ISK yourself and watching them depreciate.”) 
20
 Id. 
21
 Id. 
22
 Id. 
23
 Id. (Grimmelman notes that “the EIB was doing what offline banks do—using its deposits to make 
investments, and profiting from the spread in rates of return between them. Thus, it was acting as a true 
financial intermediary, greasing the wheels of capitalism and, in effect, helping depositors and 
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 EIB however, in spite of the perceived economic gains it might otherwise derive 
from legitimate business turned out to be an elaborate scam.
24
 Whether this was the case 
from its inception or whether its proprietor(s) fell victim to the temptation that sat in front 
of them on their computer screens is unclear.
25
 What is known is EIB’s proprietor(s) 
decided to take the deposited money and run, taking away approximately 790 billion ISK 
(EVE Online currency) which at the time equated to about $170,000.
26
 Despite the size of 
the fraud, EIB was an unregulated online bank, and as such its hoodwinked investors and 
depositors were without viable means of holding anyone liable.
27
  
 The economies of the virtual worlds have rapidly evolved almost entirely without 
a countervailing and corresponding legal system for oversight and regulation. Indeed, 
users can now purchase “stock” in virtual corporations and trade on in-game stock 
markets.
28
 While the existence of these new investment schemes raises a host of issues 
relating to securities regulation (a topic to be examined later in the paper) the potential 
hazards are demonstrated via the “Nightfreeze scam.”29 The scam, set again in EVE 
Online, involved a user named Nightfreeze who was able to entice several other users to 
invests in a plan that would allow them collectively to purchase an in-game item that 
                                                                                                                                                 
entrepreneurs find each other. ISK were going to productive use, and presumably the economy was 
humming along just a little faster.”). 
24
 Id. 
25
 Id. 
26
 Id. 
27
 See Id. (Grimmelman believes that the EIB bank scam cam dangerously close to actionable real world 
fraud and that had EIB existed in the United States and dealt in U.S. dollars the scam would indeed have 
been actionable. In so noting Grimmelman gets at a key hurdle to any type of regulatory structure in online 
worlds, that being jurisdiction.) 
28
 Post of Ed Felton to Freedom to Tinker, Virtual World, Meet Terrestrial Government, available at, 
http://freedom-to-tinker.com/blog/felten/virtual-world-meet-terrestrial-government . 
29
 See generally, Nightfreeze, The Great Scam, available at www.wirm.net/nightfreeze/ (detailed 
description of a small but successful fraudulent investment scheme perpetrated on the virtual community 
EVE Online). 
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individually they could not.
30
 Nightfreeze’s investment plan turned out to be a scam that 
allowed him to walk away with a real world value of $1,000.
31
 Without question, 
Nightfreeze’s scheme, had it taken place in the real world would have fit neatly into the 
Securities Exchange Commission’s widely accepted and enforce definition of a security 
and thereby permit an avenue for recovery and regulation.
32
  
As these two examples demonstrate, much of virtual worlds are presently 
unregulated in any meaningful way, allowing wrongdoers the chance to prey upon the 
unsuspecting or unprepared. The following section will examine how virtual worlds, and 
their lack of regulation, may be facilitating money laundering and what consequences it 
might have in the real world. 
Part II: Money Laundering 101 
 What is it and Why do we Care? 
The practice of filtering illegally obtained currency through a transaction or series 
of transactions in order to transform the “dirty” money into “clean” currency which can 
thereafter be used legitimately is by definition money laundering.
33
 This process allows 
the reaches of a given criminal enterprise to enter the lawfully operating economy or 
commerce. Given the fact that  good deal of money laundering goes undetected, 
compiling numbers on how much is actually occurring is not an exact science however, 
                                                 
30
 Id.  
31
 Id.  
32 See, 15 USC §77b(a)(1) (2000); see also, Securities Act 1933 §2(a)(1) (providing that a security shall 
be defined as any note, stock, treasury stock, security future, bond, debenture, evidence of indebtedness, 
certificate of interest or participation in any profit-sharing agreement…any interest or instrument 
commonly known as a "security", or any certificate of interest or participation in, temporary or interim 
certificate for, receipt for, guarantee of, or warrant or right to subscribe to or purchase, any of the 
foregoing).  
33
 See, U.S. Gen. Accounting Off. (GAO), Money Laundering: Efforts in the Securities Industry, GAO-02-
111 (Oct. 10, 2001), at pg 1, available at, www.gao.gov/cgi-bin/getrpt?GAO-02-111 (the link provides 
direct route to a pdf version of the document) 
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Congress has estimated that money laundering may amount to 2-5 percent of global gross 
domestic product.
34
 Officially speaking, Congress states that money launderers subvert 
legitimate financial mechanisms and banking relationships by using them as protective 
covering for the movement of criminal proceeds and the financing of crime and 
terrorism.
35
 Congress continues to maintain that in so doing, money laundering threatens 
the safety of United States citizens and undermines the integrity of United States 
financial institutions and of the global financial and trading systems upon which 
prosperity and growth depend.
36
 
 To be sure, money laundering is most often a diverse and complex process but at 
its core is comprised of three independent steps that may or may not occur 
simultaneously.
37
 The initial process, through deposits or other means, of placing 
unlawful cash proceeds into traditional financial institutions is known as “placement.”38 
The next step, “layering”, is the process of separating the proceeds of criminal activity 
from their origin through the use of complex layers of financial transactions.
39
 
“Integration,” the final of the three stages is the reintroduction of the money into the 
economy through the use of apparently legitimate transactions that serve to disguise the 
                                                 
34
 See, Uniting and Strengthening America Act by Providing Appropriate Tools Required to Intercept and 
Obstruct Terrorism Act of 2001, Pub. L. No 107-56 115 Stat. 272 (2001) [hereinafter “USA PATRIOT 
Act] (to provide a more concrete understanding of just how much money laundering Congress is estimating 
with their global GDP figure, it would likely land in the $600,000,000,000.00 category); see also, 
Computer, Telecommunications Skills Will Drive Future World Crime Waves, Money Laundering Alert, 
Apr. 2001, at LEXIS/Banking/General News & Information (estimating this same number to be closer to 
$2trillion annually and between $100-300billion in the United States). 
35
 Id. 
36
 Id. 
37
 See, Comptroller of the Currency, Comptroller’s Handbook: Bank Secrecy Act/Anti-Money Laundering 
(September 2000), at 2 [hereinafter Comptroller’s Handbook]. 
38
 Id. 
39
 Id. (Examples of transactions that are most often used in the layering stage of money laundering include 
converting cash into traverlers checks, money orders, wire transfers, letters of credit, stocks, bonds, or 
purchasing valuable assets such as jewelry or art.). 
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illegal funds.
40
 To the extent a criminal is successful in these processes their money is 
essentially “washed” and presumably will be used to continue some facet of the criminal 
enterprises and will do so without arousing any suspicions by law enforcement.  
 Money laundering is a critical component of any type of continuous organized 
criminal activity.
41
 Organized crime, in a general sense, would be unable to bankroll its 
ongoing criminal activities without the access to the legitimate financial systems that 
money laundering forges for illegal/dirty funds.
42
 Furthermore, money laundering permits 
the criminal enterprise to move, hide, and secure against confiscation by authorities of 
potentially enormous amounts of wealth.
43
 Logically then, money laundering might 
permit any criminal enterprise to escape the reaches of law enforcement but most 
recently, and no doubt most worryingly, it has become closely associated with 
international crime and terrorism.
44
 Indeed, the investigations into the September 11, 
2001 terrorist attacks of sparked a turning point for anti-money laundering legislations in 
the United States.
45
 
 The increased regulation, scrutiny, and transparency in the financial system has 
forced criminals to develop new and more creative ways to clean their money to avoid 
detection.
46
 By structuring transactions below certain reporting thresholds, mixing illegal 
                                                 
40
 Id. (The Handbook provides a non-exhaustive list of financial transactions that are often used in the 
integration stage which includes sham loans or false import/export invoices.). 
41
 See, Andres Rueda, The Implications of Strong Encryption Technology on Money Laundering, 12 Alb. 
L.J. Sci&Tech. 1, 8 (2001). 
42
 Id. 
43
 Id. 
44
 Id.  
45
 Id.  
46
 See, Selena Nelson, Note, Regulating Money Laundering in the United State and Hong Kong: A Post 9-
11 Comparison, 6 Wash. U. Global Stud. L. Rev. 723, 726 (2007) (Because money is most vulnerable at 
the placement stage, U.S. legislation has focused here by regulating financial institutions. Regulations 
including “Know Your Customer” identification requirements, Currency Transaction Reports for amounts 
Ian M.B. Leyden 
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funds with the legitimate funds of a cash intensive business (e.g. restaurant, hotel, 
casino), or using trade based money laundering techniques criminals have quickly 
adapted to the change in law.
47
 Criminals that have the financial necessity to launder 
money have demonstrated an intelligence beyond that of the common criminal. One 
would imagine however, that if presented with an equally effective and less restrictive 
method to clean their money they would justifiably jump at the opportunity. The lack of 
regulation combined with the interconnectedness on a truly global scale, of virtual 
communities might provide such an avenue.  
Money Laundering via Virtual Worlds and Their Banks 
In what has been coined “Real Money Trade” (“RMT”) within the industry, 
individuals can exchange virtual items or currency for offline, real world currency.
48
 
Most often this exchange takes place by way of internet banks, internet auctions, and 
increasingly via the mechanics of the virtual worlds themselves.
49
 This exchange is made 
possible through the notion, which the EIB and Nightfreeze scam ought to have at least 
impliedly made clear, that virtual property (e.g. land, buildings, items, or currency) has 
developed a real world value. And, quite naturally that real world value is something 
individuals are now seeking to capitalize upon. 
 Second Life alone reports that it handles over $400,000 in virtual currency each 
day, supports several thousand businesses, and in certain cases has allowed entrepreneurs 
                                                                                                                                                 
over $10,000, and Suspicious Activity Reports aim at destroying criminal anonymity and detecting illegal 
funds). 
47
 Id. 
48
 See Gregory Boyd & Matthew E. Moersfelder, Global Business in the Metaverse: Money Laundering 
and Securities Fraud, The SciTech lawyer, Winter 2007, at 4. 
49
 Id. 
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to earn over $200,000 per year in real world income.
50
 Taking a wider vantage point, 
certain reports estimate the value of RMT transactions on an annual basis to be in excess 
of $200million.
51
 The numbers, aside from being staggering for such a recent 
phenomena, demonstrate the RMT is potentially a viable and avenue for money 
laundering.
52
  
People that are in possession of illegally obtained money will always be seeking 
means by which to legitimize the funds so that they can be spent safely. While doing this 
has traditionally meant the funneling of dirty money through brick and mortar 
institutions, RMT makes available a new, more efficient, and more direct means to 
launder money.
53
 The traditional means of money laundering have required the need to 
physically relocate money over borders, requisite taxation, and compliance with reporting 
standards for businesses and financial intuitions.
54
 Consider the following example 
illustrating how an overseas criminal might transfer large sums of money across borders 
into the United States: 
First, a foreign criminal buys $500,000 worth of virtual currency for a 
certain virtual world. Depending on the virtual world, it is possible to 
purchase through third parties with minimal recording of the transaction 
and the absence of personally identifiable information required for an 
international wire transfer. After the criminal obtains the virtual currency, 
he can gain access to the virtual world and distribute that currency to two 
other player accounts. One account is for an associate in New York; the 
other for an associate in Los Angeles. Those associates can now use a 
third-party transaction to “cash out” that virtual currency.55 
                                                 
50
 See, Rosette, supra note 17, at 290 citing Peter Yellowlees, Virtual Online Worlds: Living a Second 
Life, The Economist, Sept. 30, 2006 at 77-8. 
51
 See, Boyd, supra note 5. 
52
 Id.  
53
 Id. 
54
 Id.  
55
 Id. (The authors note that there is no reason the recipients have to be in the United States and that the 
sending party and the receiving parties can be almost anywhere in the world. It is also possible, although it 
only adds what might be unnecessarily precautionary steps, to convert currency into virtual worlds or to go 
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The transaction described above has allowed a sizeable amount of money over 
international borders with no governmental regulation or reporting, little if any risk, and 
can usually completed in less than 24 hours.
56
 It is frequently the case that the virtual 
game hosts themselves maintain no record of transactions and so the practice of such 
record keeping by the banks themselves would unlikely,
57
 unnecessary, and potential 
unwise. 
 The individual structural make up of each virtual world is often critical in 
determining whether or not it is suited for money laundering. Not all virtual worlds allow 
virtual currency and those that do can be separated into games which have sanctioned and 
those that unsanctioned currency trades.
58
 Worlds with unsanctioned currency trade often 
contain third party intermediaries operating on a black market within the world and 
consequently transactional costs increase to process currency into and out of the virtual 
world.
59
 On the other hand, some worlds sanction the currency trade and will even 
process the transaction itself.
60
 Regardless of whether the currency exchange is 
                                                                                                                                                 
though multiple virtual worlds or accounts but in so doing some of the efficiencies of moving money in this 
manner will obviously be lost.). 
56
 Id. (It should be noted that despite taking funds from outside the United States in this example and 
funneling them in that the process at no point involved a bank, speaking to anyone, travel, and it is unlikely 
that any tax or game records of the transaction exist.). 
57
 Id. 
58
 Id., at 5. 
59
 Id. 
60
 Id. (In the instances in which the virtual world operators sanction a currency trade in addition to 
processing transactions which take place there is normally a fee associated. Most often that fee is minimal 
and almost certainly less than the cost to conduct a similar transaction via a third party intermediary 
operating on a currency black market in a world with an unsanctioned currency trade. The only potential 
downside to this type of transaction is the increased level of traceability. The lack of a third party 
intermediary for the exchange means that currency will mean a more direct transaction with fewer steps 
from start to finish.). 
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sanctioned or not early research indicates that currency can be moved with an efficiency 
ranging between 90 and 98 percent.
61
  
Part III: Fixing the Problem 
Clean-As-You-Go: Regulation from the Inside 
 Historically speaking the notion of regulation through the efforts of the game 
developers themselves has been unwelcome. Game developers have put forth several 
arguments in support of their “hands-off” stance. Some have argued that online games are 
merely games, and thus people who invest in them lose nothing of real value.
62
 Others 
have proffered a “swim at your own risk” response stating that people who invest in 
online games understand that nature of the games and do so at their own risk.
63
 Certain 
commentators posit that the relative lawlessness experienced in certain virtual 
communities is a direct result of this shortsighted approach taken by game developers.
64
  
Despite being late to respond, some game developers have taken a more proactive 
approach. Second life for example, does not allow users who have been registered for 
more than forty-five days from trading more than $2,000 worth of virtual currency inside 
of a thirty-day period.
65
 Further still, in August of 2007 Second Life banned gambling 
following an Federal Bureau of Investigations (“FBI”) examination into virtual casinos.66 
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While it is likely that Second Life’s invitation to the FBI and the subsequent abolishment 
of gambling was spurred by political pressure, they nevertheless took critical steps to 
prevent illegal activity, and in this specific matter cut off a potential route for money 
laundering.
67
 
Relying exclusively on regulation and enforcement by internal administrators or 
owners would not however, be a practical solution. Beyond the problem of policing an 
economy of such volume, certain technologies may stand in the way of effective 
reporting. Initially, Linden Lab required users to provide a valid credit car or Paypal 
account, or to respond to a cell phone SMS text message, in order to open an account.
68
 
As it stands now, and how it has been since June 6, 2006 users can create an account with 
nothing more than an e-mail address.
69
 In the event that authorities are in search of a 
suspicious transaction from likely terrorists, Linder Labs would be unable – assuming 
that the user registered after June 6, 2006 – to provide even so much as a name. While 
there might still be the potential that Linden could provide the user’s IP address a variety 
of software companies have widely commercialized programs that allow users’ 
computers to generate a new IP address each time they sign on.
70
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Virtual world administrators and operators are not without options. Assuming that 
a virtual world in fact has currency and furthermore a currency exchange operating, both 
the structure of the exchange and a currency cap can serve as effective tools to combat 
money laundering. Certain online worlds have established exchange rates which will 
rapidly deteriorate as the amount of virtual currency sold increases.
71
 Consequently, if a 
money launderer was attempting to transfer virtual currency back out into real world 
currency, whether he decided to do so all at once or spread over several transactions, the 
cash out value would be significantly reduced. Naturally, as the cash out value decreases 
the efficiencies of virtual world money laundering seize to exist. Alternatively, a virtual 
world, as Second Life has already done, can place a cap on the amount of money a 
registered user can exchange in a given time period.
72
 Given the relative ease with which 
a person can register a user in Second Life one has to pause to think whether this cap is 
effective, in any way, at deterring money laundering. Commentators are quick to note 
that these methods are nothing more than undersized patches to a gaping hole. As the 
economies of these virtual worlds grow, larger transactions will be possible without 
having a dramatic shift in exchange rates thereby allowing more money to be transferred 
with a much higher efficiency.
73
  
Virtual world money laundering even at its most basic level clearly can provide 
an efficiency related attractiveness to potential money launderers. As the methodology 
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also, Gourlay & Taher, supra note 14 (“Intelligence sources said that although communications traffic 
though Second Life could in theory be monitored, often the only means of tracking an individual is by 
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becomes more technical, assuming it is not already, these efficiencies could increase 
beyond their already impressive level. The more technologically savvy criminal might 
employ the use of “bots” to assist his operations. A bot is a computer controlled entity 
functioning within a virtual world designed to simulate a human player that operates 
through pre-written command language or potentially low level artificial intelligence.
74
 
Bots have already been used to perpetrate online crimes in the virtual world Lineage II.
75
 
While using bots in a money laundering context would prove more complex than a petty 
theft ring there is no reason to think it impossible or unlikely. 
The Courts: Early Signs of a Receptive “Bench” 
 Discussion of various applicable regulatory regimes to thwart money laundering 
and fraudulent investment schemes in virtual worlds would be of little merit if the judicial 
systems themselves were unwilling or unable to enforce. Case in point, neither the 
Nightfreeze, nor the EIB bank scam has led to any punishment of the perpetrators.
76
 In 
both instances a major defense has been that they were part of a game and therefore, 
anyone that invested in the schemes did not, and by definition could not, lose anything of 
real value.
77
 Furthermore, many virtual worlds state that the risk and trust necessary to 
operate in their “laizze-faire” style regulated worlds are a critical and identifying 
component of their product’s experience to its users.78 Ultimately, the question is: when, 
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if ever, does a game become, for legal purposes, a real investment of real value albeit into 
virtual items from virtual worlds? The answer to this question will likely be fertile 
grounds for debate and controversy. To the extent it is not answered by legislative bodies 
around the world, certain judiciaries have already started to provide insight into the 
matter. 
 The 1
st
 Cir. provides vital guidance for the United States courts specific to, 
whether they are willing to view a game as having real world significance. In SEC v. Sg 
Ltd., 265 F.3d 42 (1
st
 Cir. 2001) defendant, Sg Ltd (“Sg”) offered a website which hosted 
an “investment game” where virtual investors used offline currency to purchase shares 
offered by Sg in virtual companies that had no real world equivalent.
79
 Sg advertised that 
investors could buy and sell at posted prices and to do so was without risk because prices 
would inevitably continue to rise.
80
 Sg eventually suspended trading activity and with it 
the ability of any investors to withdraw funds from the game.
81
 The SEC eventually filed 
suit alleged the “game” was within the definition of an “investment contract.”82 
Predictably, Sg proffered the “game defense” positing that none of what the virtual 
investors lost had any real value.
83
  
The District Court of Massachusetts beneath it maintained the SEC had failed to 
meet the summary judgment burden. The court stated that all the transactions were in the 
context of a game and that while participants were looking for financial gain the scenario 
more closely resembled gambling than an investment scheme.
84
 The district court 
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provides, albeit in a well written manner, an opinion implicitly endorsing the game 
defense. On appeal the 1
st
 Cir. then only had before it the issues of whether the SEC had 
alleged sufficient facts to survive summary judgment.
85
 Reversing and remanding, the 
Circuit held that the SEC had in fact alleged sufficient facts to survive summary 
judgment.
86
 In so doing the viability of the game defense is no doubt undercut as the 
context of an online game was insufficient for the court to view Sg’s actions as nothing 
more than gambling but ultimately the viability of the game defense was left, on an 
explicit level, untouched.
87
 Importantly however, the court did take the time to note that 
Sg’s website disclaimers regarding the “rules of the game” would not be enough to 
dismiss the SEC complaint.
88
 In doing so, the court takes a clear stance demonstrating a 
willingness to look beyond gaming disclaimers and to the actual actions of the parties 
involved and the seriousness of the consequences even when occurring in a virtual 
world.
89
 Despite SEC v. Sg Ltd potential impact on the ability to secure convictions 
against virtual crime in the real world, the United States on an international level is 
behind the curve.
90
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 Virtual worlds are very much a global phenomenon as such examination into the 
more progressive laws and judicial actions taking place in other countries can serve as 
good indicator of what is to come on a wider scope. China has developed law designed to 
regulate and protect virtual interests.
91
 Indeed, multiple convictions have already been 
secured against perpetrators of virtual theft. In 2003 a user of the game Red Moon filed 
suit against the game operators.
92
 The user had, at great personal expense and, over a 
lengthy period of time gathered an array of virtual weapons, that rendered him invincible 
within the game.
93
 A hacker then broke into this user’s account and proceeded to pilfer 
the hard earned weaponry.
94
 The user contacted Red Moon’s operator who promptly 
refused to provide any information regarding the hackers identity.
95
 In court the gaming 
company argued that virtual properties were simply “piles of data” without any real 
world value.
96
 The court held that the user was entitled to compensation, in this instance 
in the form of the administrators returning the stolen weapons.
97
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 Foreign governments, who because of the incredible popularity of virtual world 
games in their countries, have made what appears to be best efforts to address the 
problems of virtual crime. The Chinese Public Safety Ministry issued an advisory letter to 
law enforcement on how to handle and punish the theft of virtual property
98
. As early as 
2004, South Korea alone had recorded over 10,000 arrests for theft of virtual property, a 
great deal of which resulted in convictions.
99
 In the countries with the highest levels of 
participation in virtual worlds government, law enforcement, and more importantly, the 
judiciaries have taken an unequivocal stance that virtual property is of real value and that 
the game defense is not viable.
100
 
The Feasibility of Applying Existing Regulation to a Virtual World 
 The plausibility, and some might argue inevitability, to the application of existing 
regulatory regimes to virtual worlds to get a hold of money laundering and securities 
violations ought be common sense. As we have seen virtual worlds, at least those which 
present potential problems, have duplicated with precision the capitalist market structures 
of developed real world nations. While the regimes to be explored bellow might appear 
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somewhat disparate relative to each other, their working in concert is critical to making 
virtual worlds a secure financial environment. As the EIB bank scam demonstrates 
banking institutions are becoming, if not already, accepted business inside the presently 
unregulated virtual worlds. While EIB was a short lived scam the potential for money 
laundering or the facilitation of securities fraud might well increase with a more 
established and permanent virtual bank. 
Money Services Businesses 
 The Bank Security Act (“BSA”) enacted in 1970 enables the Secretary of 
Treasury to issue regulatory measures which require certain reports and disclosures be 
made by operations fitting the provided definition of a “financial institution.”101 As might 
be expected, financial enterprises such as banks, securities firms, and insurance 
companies are subject to different, and more stringent, regulation than non-financial 
institutions.
102
 The BSA currently regulate a great deal of depository institutions, among 
them banks, credit unions, casinos, securities brokers and dealers, and money services 
businesses (“MSBs”).103 
 The BSA mandates that financial institutions maintain continuous and detailed 
record keeping and reporting systems.
104
 In so doing, the BSA has the financial 
institutions themselves create and keep the paper trail that serves the dual purpose of 
deterring illegal activity and assists law enforcement in their investigations.
105
 The 
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ultimate objective of the BSA’s regulations is to prevent financial institutions from being 
used by criminals to hide, deposit, or transfer illegal funds.
106
 
 In a continued effort to control money laundering the Secretary of Treasury issued 
a series of rules to apply to the actions of MSBs.
107
 In 1999 the Secretary ruled that “a 
business that meets one or more of the definitions of a type of MSB is an MSB” and 
therefore would need to comply with the applicable BSA requirements as an MSB 
generally, its specific type of MSB, and as a financial institution in general.
108
 MSBs are 
defined as institutions handling business transactions including money orders, money 
transfers, check cashing, traveler’s checks, currency dealing, currency exchange, and 
stored value.
109
 It would seem that both online virtual banks and virtual currency 
exchanges (sanctioned or non-sanctioned) would nearly fit within the defined sphere of 
an MSB. At the very least even a rudimentary online virtual banks’ activities of taking 
deposits, making loans, and transferring funds would facially satisfy the definition of 
“money transmitters.”110 
 The regulatory measures ought under the BSA in general, and the MSBs more 
specifically, make difficult the laundering of money though virtual worlds. Among the 
requirements for MSBs they are required to develop and implement an anti-money 
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laundering system (“AML”) compliance system.111 Certain MSBs are required to 
maintain a list of any agents they have.
112
 In addition, if an MSB has suspicion, 
knowledge, or reasons to suspect any transaction as non-legitimate and it includes 
aggregate funds of $2,000 or more it must file a Suspicious Activity Report (“SAR”) with 
the Secretary of Treasury.
113
 Importantly, an MSB that provides a money transfer of 
$3,000 or more, or currency exchange of $1,000 or more to any customer within a period 
of 24 hours must maintain a record of that transaction.
114
 
 MSBs and other qualifying institutions, operating under the BSA, face penalties 
for non-compliance. Depending on the specific factual circumstances a financial 
institution can be required to submit up to five reports to the government. A reporting 
violation can carry with it civil and criminal liability.
115
 Furthermore, section 314(b) of 
the PATRIOT Act permits financial institutions that have already provided notice to the 
Department of Treasury to share information with the federal government in order to 
identify and fend off activities that may involve money laundering or terrorism.
116
 Lastly, 
                                                 
111
 See, FINCEN Reg., Money Services Businesses Home Page, available at 
http://www.fincen.gov/financial_institutions/msb/index.html.   
112
 Id. 
113
 Id.; see also, FINCEN Reg., Money Services Businesses Suspicious Activity Report (SAR), available 
at, http://www.fincen.gov/financial_institutions/msb/msbsar.html (the website provides the more expansive 
definition of what suspicious activity consists of: (1)Involves funds derived from illegal activity or is 
intended or conducted in order to hide or disguise funds or assets derived from illegal activity, or (2) is 
Designed to evade the requirements of the Bank Secrecy Act, whether through structuring or other means, 
or (3) Serves no business or apparent lawful purpose, and the reporting business knows of no reasonable 
explanation for the transaction after examining all available facts.). 
 
114
 Id. 
115
 See,  FINCEN Reg., SAR Reporting Penalties, available at, 
http://www.fincen.gov/financial_institutions/msb/definitions/penalties_A.html ; see also, 31 USC §5313, 
available at, http://www.law.cornell.edu/uscode/31/usc_sec_31_00005313----000-.html; see also, 31 USC 
§5321, available at, http://law.justia.com/us/codes/title31/31usc5321.html ; see also, 31 USC §5322, 
available at, http://trac.syr.edu/laws/31/31USC05322.html.  
116
 See, FINCEN Reg., US PATRIOT Act Information, available at, 
http://www.fincen.gov/statutes_regs/patriot/index.html.  
Ian M.B. Leyden 
 26 
it should be noted that the BSA contains pertinent language regarding foreign-based 
transactions.
117
 Due to the fact that virtual worlds are often global in their reach the threat 
of money laundering from outside the boarders of the United States are most critical.
118
 
 The application of MSB requirements through the BSA to virtual worlds, just as it 
is in the real world, would not render money laundering impossible. It would however, 
significantly affect the efficiencies with which money laundering could be done and 
thereby the impetus to do so within these virtual communities. Money laundering in 
virtual worlds is viable precisely because of these regulations not having been 
implemented. Admittedly, MSB regulation is only one piece of a more complicated 
puzzle in preventing virtual worlds from being taken advantage of by money launderers. 
For regulation to truly be effective it will require the tracking of money flows, monitoring 
transactions, and taxation or some taxing authority of personal and business income 
generated in virtual worlds.
119
 
Application of Securities Regulation to Virtual Worlds 
 The term “investment contract” operates as one of the SEC’s most useful terms. 
Serving as a catch-all, the term extends securities laws to the non-obvious financial 
arrangements. Courts have been liberal in their interpretation of what satisfies as an 
“investment contract” limiting its reach, on a general sense, only to where there is no 
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perceived investment interest/value.
120
 As we have seen, the notion that what is invested 
in a virtual worlds is without “real value” has largely been rejected and, to the extent it 
retains any foothold its grip is tenuous at best.  
 The current test to determine whether a particular financial instrument is an 
“investment contract” and therefore a security was set forth in SEC v. W.J. Howey Co., 
328 U.S. 293 (1946). The established test states that an “investment contract” is: (1) the 
investment of money; (2) in a common enterprise; (3) with the expectation of profits 
derived solely from the efforts of others.
121
 In addition, the court stated that this test must 
be applied in light of the economic realities of the transaction; the substance of the 
transaction will govern its form.
122
 The broad definition and interpretation by the courts 
demonstrates quite clearly that to the extent the test is satisfied the SEC will regard that 
product an investment contract and thereby a security.
123
 
 This expansive “investment contract” test taken together with the previously 
discussed SEC v. Sg Ltd. indicates that the substance over form framework will continue 
to persist in virtual worlds as well. While the court did not answer the ultimate question 
of whether the users of the website were paying for an investment or a game the court did 
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provide some insight to what it would be likely to do.
124
 As previously discussed, the 
First Circuit looked past the posted online disclaimers regarding the financial instruments 
and the parties’ actions. While subtle, this move has prompted many commentators to 
confidently state that the court would have, and will if need be in the future, not honor a 
game defense while applying the Howey “investment contract” test.125 
A Word of Caution When Regulators Come Knocking on the Virtual Door 
 The verbatim application of existing regulation to virtual worlds might well have 
some chilling effects to the economies of virtual worlds. For example, if securities laws 
were to be applied to virtual worlds in the exact same way that they are in the real world 
the end result might not be a desired one.
126
 More specifically, if the SEC were to require 
registration of offerings in virtual worlds it would have a significant chilling affect on 
virtual economies. The cost of registration is most often hundreds of thousands of dollars 
while the amount raised in a virtual world public offering is significantly less. An IPO 
that occurred on the Second Life Capital Exchange offered nearly 600,000 shares at 
$L5.
127
 This offering, depending on the exact exchange rate, generated between $11,000 
– 12,000 which would be wholly insufficient to cover the prevailing cost of going 
public.
128
 Ultimately, the enforcement of certain securities laws will deter business 
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 SEC v. Sg Ltd., 265 F.3d 42 (1st Cir. 2001). 
125
 See, Boyd Supra note 75, at 6-7; see also, Shannon L. Thompson, Article, Securities Regulation in a 
Virtual World, 16 UCLA Ent. L. Rev. 89 (2009) (stating that the courts willingness in Sg Ltd. to continue 
to choose substance over form increase the likelihood that real world laws will be applied to virtual 
worlds). 
126
 See, Thompson, supra note 102, citing, Benjamin Duranske, Commentary: Virtual Law Firm Hired by 
Virtual Company in “IPO” Stage, Virtually Blind, Jan. 6, 2008, 
http://virtuallyblind.com/2008/01/05/virtual-firm-hired/ (providing the specifics for the example that 
follows in the text above). 
127
 Id. 
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 Id.; see also, David Orloff, The Price of Going Public, Orange County Business Journal, May 29, 2000, 
available at, http://www.allbusiness.com/north-america/united-states-california-metro-areas/1062563-
1.html (IPOs can cost a company anywhere from $100,000 to a few million dollars. Including the 
Ian M.B. Leyden 
 29 
development, the raising of capital, and in the end the viability of continued expansion of 
virtual economies.
129
 
Part IV: A Final Word for Our Virtual Regulators To Be 
 To conclude then, while this paper does advocate a quick and strong application 
of existing regulatory regimes it does not support such application blindly. The small 
scale that virtual world economies operate upon – at least relative to the economies the 
regulations were designed for – necessitate a thoughtful selection and adaptation of 
regulations. For those people charged with making these decisions they ought focus most 
upon those regulations that will deter and complicate schemes designed to defraud users 
or establish institutions to facilitate money laundering with an eye towards the unwanted 
potential that overbroad regulation will do much harm to a new and potentially invaluable 
resource in virtual worlds. 
                                                                                                                                                 
underwriter's fee, going public can cost a company up to 15% of the total amount raised in the real world 
economy. The amount of money raised in a virtual setting pales in comparison and as such makes it largely 
impossible to accomplish. In this article the expert interviewed concluded that he would find it hard to 
conceive a paper going public for anything under $100,000.). 
129
 See, Duranske, supra note 104. 
